Even under conservative assumptions, IDA will likely face a wave of country graduations by 2025. We project that it will lose more than half of its client countries and that the total population living in IDA-eligible countries will plunge by twothirds. The remaining IDA-eligible countries will be significantly smaller in size and overwhelmingly African, and a majority are currently considered fragile or postconflict. This drastically altered client base will have significant implications for IDA's operational and financial models. We conclude with three possible options for IDA and recommend that World Bank shareholders and management begin frank discussions on its future sooner rather than later.
Fast forward to 2025. In that year, the World Bank's shareholders will begin discussing the 21 st replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA). Every three years since IDA's founding in 1960, the shareholders have met to consider financial contributions that enable the Bank's soft loan window to make low-interest loans and grants to the governments of the world's poorest countries. In addition to deciding how much to pledge, the shareholders also use the replenishment negotiations to consider policy and strategic changes for the institution.
In 2025, IDA will be turning 65 years old. By then, the institution will be able to claim widespread success -pointing to the large number of countries that have -graduated‖ from IDA as a result of growing too wealthy to qualify for its assistance. IDA, as an institution serving its shareholders, has twin goals: (1) to provide finance to countries which cannot borrow because of low-income or lack of creditworthiness; and (2) to help countries grow wealthier and improve their policies so that they can turn to commercial markets or the World Bank's hard window for their capital needs. Indeed, the structural irony of IDA is that its strategic goals are in contradiction with its own growth, and even survival, as an institution. In short, IDA's success is in large part determined by its ability to shrink its own client base.
For most of its history, IDA has not been forced to confront this graduation issue directly. The pool of low-income countries has been sufficiently large, and donor/shareholder attention to the needs of poor countries sufficiently strong. This combination of factors usually justified continually larger replenishments. The total number of IDA eligible countries rose as these states gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Over the intervening years, some 27 countries graduated from IDA by growing too wealthy. 1 The graduation of China, its largest client, in 1999 partly justified a steep decline in the IDA-11 replenishment period envelope . However, steady replenishment growth resumed afterward. In December 2010, IDA concluded its 16 th replenishment -its largest ever -with an overall financing envelope totaling of $49.3 billion for 2011-13, including $34.7 billion in donor shareholder contributions.
Today, the total number of IDA-eligible countries stands at 79. However, by 2025, IDA's client base likely will look very different. A large number of clients, includ ing some of IDA's largest borrowers and many of its best-performing clients, currently are pushing up against the income threshold and thus are expected to graduate within the next 10 to 15 years. This paper projects IDA graduation for the next fifteen years as a thought exercise about the future of IDA. Specifically, what countries will remain IDA clients in 2025? What will be their profile and needs? What will this changed client base mean for the future of the Bank? And, what might it mean for IDA's operations and strategic direction today?
We find that the pool of clients will change considerably. We find that:
 IDA will lose more than half of its client countries within the next 15 years.
3  The client base will become overwhelmingly African and dominated by countries currently classified as fragile or post-conflict states.
 These changes bring major implications for IDA's operational and financial model.
We conclude by suggesting three possible models going forward. First, IDA management and shareholders could attempt to maintain the status quo approach in financial and operational terms. This would imply that assistance envelopes would increase several-fold for the remaining recipient countries. We call this the hope for the best approach. Second, country flows could remain constant in real terms. At the same time, IDA's overall size would shrink due to country graduation over time. In practice, this approach may make regular donor replenishments unnecessary beyond the IDA-20 or IDA-21 periods. Third, management and shareholders could decide to overhaul IDA's basic allocation model -thereby shifting from its existing country-based approach to a regional or global public goods driven model. These conclusions, combined with the long-term nature of IDA's financing and operations, suggest that World Bank management and shareholders should begin discussions soon about the future of IDA and the best way to meet the World Bank's overarching goal of a -world free of poverty‖.
II. PROJECTING THE POOL OF IDA-ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES IN 2025
The first step in thinking about IDA's future is to project its client base. Decisions about programmatic focus areas, IDA's cooperation with other development institutions, and its financing envelope all will be driven by which countries will remain eligible for IDA assistance. Although future rates of economic growth are impossible to project with pinpoint accuracy, there are plausible scenarios for estimating who will be in and who will be out.
Methodology: Current IDA eligibility is determined by two factors: (1) GDP per capita below a pre-established threshold; and (2) lack of creditworthiness that prevents borrowing from the World Bank's commercial lending window, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In our projections, we use GDP per capita as the primary indicator of future IDA eligibility and assume that all countries below the threshold also meet the lack of creditworthiness criterion. 2 Currently, the operational threshold for IDA eligibility is set at a GNI per capita of $1,165 in real 2009 dollars. For simplicity, we hold all calculations in constant 2009 U.S. dollars and apply real growth rates. Assuming no change in the operational threshold for IDA other than adjustments 4 for inflation -a reasonable assumption given past practice -we then compare countries' projected real GDP per capita to the current threshold to determine when countries are likely to cross the operational threshold.
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In practice, countries do not immediately graduate after breaching this income-based threshold. In making its own internal predictions, IDA includes a five-year delay between exceeding the threshold and the cessation of new IDA lending (i.e., formal graduation).
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This delay allows country authorities adequate time to plan for their changed borrowing status. It also is designed to prevent -reverse-graduation‖ as a result of short-term volatility in income levels and creditworthiness. For consistency, we follow this practice and apply a five-year lag between when a country first crosses the $1,165 GNI per capita threshold and our projected graduation date. Small Island Nation Exclusion: IDA currently has an exception that allows for extension of assistance to eleven small island countries that are above the eligibility threshold. This exception is based upon the premise that these countries still need development assistance due to special constraints inherent to small countries (i.e. small domestic markets, high cost of infrastructure, acute vulnerability to natural disasters, etc.). Because credits to these countries represent a very small percentage of the total IDA lending (less than 0.5 percent for the IDA-15 period), and because decisions to graduate small island countries 3 The main difference between GDP and GNI is that the latter includes income received from other countries (e.g., interest and dividends) less similar payments made to other countries. Three Alternative Scenarios: Predicting GDP growth rates fifteen years into the future is a highly uncertain exercise. Ultimately, our projections depend upon the accuracy of WEO forecasts. This is particularly problematic given a historical tendency by the IMF to systematically over-project growth rates for low-income countries. 15 For robustness checks, we ran three additional scenarios with more conservative growth rates, including:
(1) cutting long-term growth rates (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) (2021) (2022) (2023) (2024) (2025) [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [2017] [2018] [2019] [2020] [2021] [2022] [2023] [2024] [2025] . Even under these more conservative growth scenarios, the overall country graduation findings do not change significantly. This is mainly because a significant portion of IDA-eligible countries are already close to the income threshold. Therefore, they will more than comfortably graduated from IDA by 2025 even with modest growth rates. However, there are a few country graduation differences, including: Note on Shocks and Reverse Graduation: Our analysis makes an additional simplifying assumption that countries will not fall into conflict or experience a significant economic shock -either of which would impact growth rates, IDA graduation prospects, and the possibility of -reverse graduation‖. Historically, eight out of IDA's 35 previous graduates eventually reverse graduated. This would suggest that countries face a roughly one-quarter chance of falling back over time. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that several countries projected to graduate by 2025 will experience some type of shock that prevents them from doing so. However, most IDA-eligible countries are relatively small in size and their failure to graduate would not have a significant impact on the resource demand projections. Of the current IDA-eligible countries, only a major crisis in India, Vietnam, Nigeria, or Pakistan would have a meaningful effect on IDA's overall operational and financial projections. Conclusion: Based on the above analysis, the composition of IDA's client base will change dramatically over the next 15 years. The vast majority of its clients will be in Africa, and the majority either will be considered fragile states or newly emerged from fragility. Importantly, these projections are not dependent on rosy growth scenarios, but remain likely even under more conservative assumptions.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR IDA AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS A. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Such a dramatic shift in IDA's client base has serious implications for the institution's future and how the World Bank operates overall. Two operational implications come immediately to mind: (1) the fragile states conundrum; and (2) division of labor with the African Development Bank (AfDB).
Grappling with the Fragile States Conundrum: Although some of the remaining IDA countries will likely improve performance over time, it seems probable that the average country performance level will drop. The current IDA model is to focus on highperforming countries and also to have special side facilities for post-conflict, poorlyperforming, or fragile states. This dynamic may reverse by 2025, with fragile states forming the majority of IDA's client base in terms of total countries. This may raise alarm bells since the World Bank has long identified the difficulties of working and staffing in fragile states. To date, it has made little progress in meeting these challenges. The World Bank's own evaluation group noted that efforts in fragile states was focused on areas of -traditional weakness‖, showed a lack of selectivity, and have not yet overcome human resource problems.
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Thus, the IDA of 2025 will face serious hurdles in terms of its strategic model, use of performance incentives, and staffing. For instance, Gelb (2011) suggests that the current performance based-allocation system does not create sufficient incentives for either staff or recipient country officials in countries with IRAI scores below 3.25 due to time lags and other factors. 21 He suggests that IDA should augment its performance-based allocation system with a short-term feedback portfolio score to enable quicker response to successful projects and to shut down failing ones. This problem is no longer a marginal and lagging side business, but rather becomes almost the raison d'être of IDA. (1) A clearer division of labor with its sister AfDF by focusing on its core competencies and withdrawing from sectors where others have the lead. Without prejudging this outcome, one illustrative example could be that the AfDF would assume the lead on infrastructure and private sector development while IDA would focus on financial management and the social sectors.
(2) A new way of collaborating. At the strategic and operational levels, IDA must find a way of working more closely with the AfDF in a regular and coordinated manner rather than ad hoc arrangements.
B. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The projected evolution of IDA's client base over time will raise a number of financial considerations both for the institution's management and its donor country shareholders. period, this could mean reducing the overall replenishment envelope by more than onehalf compared to the baseline financial scenario -thereby ensuring that countries would still receive roughly $8 per capita annually in real terms (versus $17 per capita annually). 31 Strikingly, this would mean that donors could almost cease to provide regular contributions during the IDA-21 period. However, they would need to continue to offset the foregone revenue associated with the provision of debt relief and grants (see Figure 4 ).
Debt Relief and Grant Financing Considerations: According to IDA, foregone revenues associated with HIPC and MDRI debt relief and grant financing will total nearly $10 billion (nominal terms) during the IDA-21 period. 32 Given the reduced demand for IDA assistance following country graduations, donor governments could decide to halt compensatory contributions that offset this impact during the IDA-21 period (or even before). Assuming IDA management's other baseline assumptions, then recipient countries still would receive real assistance volumes of roughly $15 per capita annually.
33
As such, donor governments also could reduce their regular contributions while still delivering massive increases for recipient countries. 
IV. CONCLUSION: OPTIONS FOR IDA GOING FORWARD
Given the operational and financial implications outlined above, this leaves IDA with three broad options:
(1) Stay the Course and Hope for the Best: IDA could maintain its current allocation system and continue to argue every three years for replenishments at the current (or even higher) levels. This would entail justifying significant increases in country allocations, and defending requests for shareholder contributions against other development spending options. This option would assume that: (a) the donor shareholders continue to view IDA as a central and effective mechanism; (b) that IDA's country-based allocation model remains the optimal approach to promoting development and fighting poverty; and (c) that increased spending per country is justified.
(2) Declare Success and Shrink Over Time: Another option is to simply scale IDA down to meet the needs and size of the smaller client base. If IDA flows were held constant real per capita terms, then IDA-21 may in fact be the last replenishment for regular donor contributions. The shareholders, after 65 years of subsidizing IDA (and many wondering when it all ends) would have an end date for new contributions and also be able to maintain financing at the current levels. In pursuing this approach, shareholders might even be able to reclaim depreciated dividends starting in subsequent periods.
(3) Launch A New Regional/Global Public Goods Window within IDA: A third option is for IDA to complement -or even replace -its country-based lending model with a wholly different approach for funding global public goods (GPGs). The potential arguments in favor of this model are compelling since the number of low-income countries is rapidly declining and many of the great remaining challenges -energy, technology, regional infrastructure, agricultural research, and vaccines -are beyond any single country investment strategy. Moreover, these important development issues traditionally have been underfunded. 34 The challenge of finding a performance-compatible allocation strategy for GPGs is significant, but there is time to conceive of new models. In fact, the launching of a special GPG window may provide an opportunity to update IDA's governance structure and draw in some of the recent graduates as active contributors. 
Debt Relief Costs
Additional donor contributions on a pay-as-you-go basis to cover all foregone credit reflows associated with HIPC and MDRI debt relief.
IDA Grant Costs
Additional donor contributions on a pay-as-you-go basis to offset foregone loan principal repayments. Foregone loan charge income is financed through volume discounts on IDA grants.
IDA Grant Share
Constant at 20 percent of total IDA commitments.
Non-Accruals
Remain stable at 5 percent of IDA's total credit portfolio.
Loan Charges
Fixed service charge of 75 basis points; commitment charge reset annually between 0 and 50 basis points as required to cover any annual income gap.
Administrative Expenses
Flat in real terms, in line with IBRD corporate assumptions.
IBRD/IFC Transfers
Constant at $3.9 billion per replenishment period ($1.3 billion annually).
Inflation
Constant at 2 percent per annum. Country Allocation Score (Step #2): IDA utilizes exponents to apply relative weightings to each of the three variables in the PBA formula. The country performance rating currently has an exponent of 5.0 and the population variable has an exponent of 1.0. Lastly, IDA applies an exponent of -0.125 to the GNI per capita variable. This is designed to modestly reduce IDA allocations for countries with relatively higher per capita income levels. In doing so, the PBA has a methodological favoring toward countries with greater needs (with income as a proxy measure). Relative Country Allocation Share (Step #3): IDA then determines the relative allocation share for each country. The relative share is calculated by dividing each country's IDA allocation score by the total allocation score of all eligible countries.
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37 Country performance for each CPIA criteria is rated between 1 (lowest) and 6 (highest). 38 To ensure CPIA rating consistency within and across regions, the World Bank extensively reviews and vets CPIA assessments for 12 "benchmark" countries. 3/ Based on a constant inflation rate of 2 percent. 4/ Boxes indicate that the country is eligible for exceptional post-conflict assistance from IDA. These countries currently receive significantly higher IDA assistance volumes than if they were subject to the regular PBA system parameters. This explains why their assistance volume differentials between the IDA-15 and IDA-21 periods are much lower, on average, than for other countries. 
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